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19781 SURVEY OF NEW YORK PRACTICE
trespass that have resulted in punitive damage awards have gener-
ally been accompanied by threats, violence or repeated intrusions
on the plaintiff's property.2 2 Although this type of conduct was
absent in Le Mistral, the appellate division held that punitive dam-
ages could properly be awarded. While it is uncertain whether the
courts will be as willing to approve punitive damage awards in tres-
pass actions generally, it is clear that where attempts by the news
media to obtain information infringe on the rights of others, liability
and large punitive damage awards may result.
Ronald S. Meckler
Prima facie tort action upheld despite absence of special damages
and specific intent to harm
Under the prima facie tort doctrine, a wrong which does not fall
within a traditional tort category may nevertheless be actionable if
the wrongdoer, without just cause or excuse,23 has wilfully and in-
tentionally caused injury.24 As the doctrine has evolved in New
acted with "actual malice," or that the defendant's conduct evinced a "wanton and willful
or reckless disregard of plaintiff's rights." MacKennan v. Jay Bern Realty Co., 30 App. Div.
2d 679, 679, 291 N.Y.S.2d 953, 954 (2d Dep't 1968); see Fury Imports, Inc. v. Shakespeare
Co., 554 F.2d 1376, 1388.89 (5th Cir. 1977); Walker v. Sheldon, 10 N.Y.2d 401, 179 N.E.2d
497, 223 N.Y.S.2d 488 (1961).
Although not explicitly required by the standard, a showing of violent acts or repeated
intrusions has been necessary for the plaintiff to satisfy his burden of proof. See note 252 &
accompanying text infra.
5 See Wort v. Jenkins, 14 Johns. 352 (1817) (per curiam); Smalling v. Jackson, 133 App.
Div. 382, 117 N.Y.S. 268 (2d Dep't 1909); Sheldon v. Baumann, 19 App. Div. 61, 45 N.Y.S.
1016 (1st Dep't 1897); DaCosta v. Technico Constr. Corp., 74 Misc. 2d 583, 344 N.Y.S.2d 967
(N.Y.C. Civ. Ct. N.Y. County 1973), aff'd per curiam, 78 Misc. 2d 1100, 360 N.Y.S.2d 846
(Sup. Ct. App. T. 1st Dep't 1974); Norton v. Glicksman, 9 Misc. 2d 985, 174 N.Y.S.2d 12
(Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1957); Tifft v. Culver, 3 Hill 180 (Sup. Ct. Utica County 1842);
Steenburgh v. McRorie, 60 Misc. 510, 113 N.Y.S. 1118 (Otsego County Ct. 1908).
211 Any excuse or justification, including profit motive or business justification, is suffi-
cient in New York to negate evidence of actual malice. See, e.g., Squire Records, Inc. v.
Vanguard Recording Soc. Inc., 25 App. Div. 2d 190, 268 N.Y.S.2d 251 (1st Dep't 1966) (per
curiam), aff'd mem., 19 N.Y.2d 797, 226 N.E.2d 542, 279 N.Y.S.2d 737 (1967); note 255 infra.
Hecht v. Air Reduction Co., 41 Misc. 2d 463, 245 N.Y.S.2d 935 (Sup. Ct. Queens County
1963).
24 Knapp Engraving Co. v. Keystone Photo Engraving Corp., 1 App. Div. 2d 170, 172,
148 N.Y.S.2d 635, 637 (1st Dep't 1956); Brandt v. Winchell, 283 App. Div. 338. 342, 127
N.Y.S.2d 865, 868 (1st Dep't 1954), affl'd, 3 N.Y.2d 628, 148 N.E.2d 160, 170 N.Y.S.2d 828
(1958). Traditional tort law has been criticized by one noted commentator as "a set of pigeon-
holes, each bearing a name, into which the act or omission of the defendant must be fitted
before the law will take cognizance of it and afford a remedy." W. PRossER, LAw oF ToRTs §
1 (4th ed. 1971). In response to this inherent rigidity, the courts developed the prima facie
tort doctrine as a means of providing redress in instances where harm is intentionally and
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW [Vol. 52:594
York, a plaintiff seeking to establish a prima facie tort claim is
required to allege and prove specific intent to harm2ss and special
maliciously inflicted through conduct that would otherwise be lawful. See Advance Music
Corp. v. American Tobacco Co., 296 N.Y. 79, 70 N.E.2d 401 (1946); Ruza v. Ruza, 286 App.
Div. 767, 769, 146 N.Y.S.2d 808, 811 (1st Dep't 1955). See also Halpern, Intentional Torts
and the Restatement, 7 BUFFALO L. Rxv. 7, 13 (1957); Note, The Prima Facie Tort Doctrine,
52 COLUM. L. Rv. 503, 505 (1952) [hereinafter cited as Prima Facie Tort Doctrine]; Note,
The Prima Facie Tort Doctrine in New York-Another Writ?, 42 ST. JOHN's L. REv. 530, 532-
33 (1968) [hereinafter cited as Another Writ?].
Originally derived from actions on the case, see Knapp Engraving Co. v. Keystone Photo
Engraving Corp., 1 App. Div. 2d 170, 172, 148 N.Y.S.2d 635, 637 (1st Dep't 1956), the prima
facie tort concept was first articulated in England in Mogul S.S. Co. v. McGregor, Gow, &
Co., 23 Q.B.D. 598 (1889), aff'd, [1892] A.C. 25, wherein Lord Bowen stated:
"[I]ntentionally to do that which is calculated in the ordinary course of events to damage,
and which does, in fact, damage another in that other person's property or trade, is actionable
if done without just cause or excuse." 23 Q.B.D. at 613. The concept was subsequently
adopted in the United States in Aikens v. Wisconsin, 195 U.S. 194, 204 (1904) (citing Mogul
S.S. Co. v. McGregor, Gow, & Co., 23 Q.B.D. 598, 613 (1889), affl'd, [1892] A.C. 25).
While the precise history of the prima facie tort in New York is difficult to trace, the
courts appear to have used the broad principles of the doctrine for the first time in Beardsley
v. Kilmer, 236 N.Y. 80, 140 N.E. 203 (1923), wherein the Court of Appeals stated: [Tihe
courts in response to a broader and more equitable vision of the interrelated rights of individu-
als have tended toward the denial of this proposition that it is lawful to perform an otherwise
legal act injuring another when there is no excuse for its performance except the malicious
purpose of injury. Id. at 89, 140 N.E. at 205 (citations omitted). After Beardsley, the doctrine
was applied with increasing frequency. See, e.g., American Guild of Musical Artists, Inc. v.
Petrillo, 286 N.Y. 226, 36 N.E.2d 123 (1941); Opera on Tour, Inc. v. Weber, 285 N.Y. 348, 34
N.E.2d 349 (1941); Al Raschid v. News Syndicate Co., 265 N.Y. 1, 191 N.E. 713 (1934).
Finally, in Advance Music Corp. v. American Tobacco Co., 296 N.Y. 79, 70 N.E.2d 401 (1946),
the Court of Appeals stated that the prima facie tort is one of the "general principe[s] of
liability in tort" and therefore is not limited in application to any particular class of cases.
Id. at 84, 70 N.E.2d at 403. For an in-depth account of the doctrine's development in the
common law, see Forkosch, An Analysis of the "Prima Facie Tort" Cause of Action, 42
CoRNELL L.Q. 465 (1957); Halpern, supra, at 7.
2" In Beardsley v. Kilmer, 236 N.Y. 80, 140 N.E. 203 (1923), the Court of Appeals stated
that an otherwise lawful act is actionable only if the defendant is shown to have been moti-
vated entirely by "disinterested malevolence . . . unmixed with any other [motive] and
exclusively directed to injury and damage of another." Id. at 90, 140 N.E. at 206 (citation
omitted). Thus, in New York, proof that the defendant intended to do the injury-producing
act, usually sufficient to establish an intentional tort claim, is insufficient to establish a
prima facie tort. Ruza v. Ruza, 286 App. Div. 767, 769, 146 N.Y.S.2d 808, 811 (1st Dep't 1955).
This strict view of the intent requirement was upheld in Reinforce, Inc. v. Birney, 308 N.Y.
164, 124 N.E.2d 104 (1954), wherein the Court of Appeals dismissed the complaint of a
contracter who alleged that the defendant-union's refusal to supply workers forced him out
of business. The Reinforce Court, in support of its holding, observed that the plaintiff had
failed to show "that malice was the only spur to the union's sole activity or that damage to
plaintiffs was the union's purpose." Id. at 167, 124 N.E.2d at 105 (emphasis added); see
Benton v. Kennedy-Van Saun Mfg. & Eng'r Corp., 2 App. Div. 2d 27, 152 N.Y.S.2d 955 (1st
Dep't 1956); Girard Trust Co. v. Melville Shoe Corp., 275 App. Div. 117, 88 N.Y.S.2d 121
(1st Dep't), aff'd mem., 300 N.Y. 496, 88 N.E.2d 724 (1949). Some commentators have argued
that the strict intent requirement relegates the prima facie tort doctrine to an impotent role.
See, e.g., Forkosch, supra note 254, at 479; Another Writ?, supra note 254, at 535.
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damages.2 Recently, however, in Drago u. Buonagurio,s7 the Ap-
pellate Division, Third Department, upheld a prima facie tort ac-
tion against an attorney for the initiation and prosecution of a frivo-
lous malpractice claim although the plaintiff's complaint failed to
allege special damages and specific intent.2ss
The plaintiff in Drago was a physician who had been charged
in an earlier suit with professional malpractice purportedly leading
to the death of Francis Buonagurio.2ss The malpractice action had
been instituted at the direction of Jerome Brownstein, an attorney
retained by the estate of the deceased. 60 Alleging that Brownstein
had no basis to believe that he had treated the deceased, the physi-
cian sued both the administratrix of the Buonagurio estate and
Brownstein for bringing a malpractice suit with malicious disregard
for the truth of the underlying claims.81 In his complaint, the plain-
tiff requested $200,000 in general damages. 212 Upon Brownstein's
motion, the Supreme Court, Schenectady County, dismissed the
complaint for failure to state a cause of action.26
3
On appeal, the Appellate Division, Third Department, re-
2m A.T.I., Inc. v. Ruder & Finn, 42 N.Y.2d 454, 368 N.E.2d 1230, 398 N.Y.S. 2d 864
(1977); John C. Supermarket, Inc. v. New York Property Ins. Underwriting Ass'n., 60 App.
Div. 2d 807, 400 N.Y.S.2d 824 (1st Dep't 1978); Brandt v. Winchell, 283 App. Div. 338, 127
N.Y.S.2d 865 (lst Dep't 1954), aff'd, 3 N.Y.2d 628, 148 N.E.2d 160, 170 N.Y.S.2d 828 (1958).
The pecuniary loss requirement arises in part because the prima facie tort theory evolved
from the common-law form of action on the case, which required proof of special damages.
See W. PRossEa, LAw OF ToRs § 7 (4th ed. 1971).
In addition, to satisfy the requirement of actual pecuniary loss, the plaintiff's complaint
"must state specifically and with particularity the items of loss claimed by the plaintiff,
giving the names of the employers, customers or others who are claimed to have taken away
their business from plaintiff." Faulk v. Aware, Inc., 3 Misc. 2d 833, 839, 155 N.Y.S.2d 726,
732 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1956) (citations omitted), aff'd mem., 3 App. Div. 2d 703, 160
N.Y.S.2d 621 (1st Dep't 1957). Thus, a plaintiff who could allege only damage to his reputa-
tion would fail to state a cause of action in New York. See Friedlander v. National Broadcast-
ing Co., 39 Misc. 2d 612, 241 N.Y.S.2d 477 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1963), rev'd per curiam on
other grounds, 20 App. Div. 2d 701, 246 N.Y.S.2d 889 (1st Dep't 1964); J.J. Theatres, Inc. v.
V.R.O.K. Co., 96 N.Y.S.2d 271 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1950).
2" 61 App. Div. 2d 282, 402 N.Y.S.2d 250 (3d Dep't 1978), rev'g 89 Misc. 2d 171, 391
N.Y.S.2d 61 (Sup. Ct. Schenectady County 1977).
2m 61 App. Div. 2d at 286-87, 402 N.Y.S.2d at 253.
2' Id. at 284, 402 N.Y.S.2d at 251.
m Id.
u I Id. The plaintiff in Drago alleged that the defendant attorney: (1) failed to fully
investigate the facts before bringing the malpractice suit; (2) conducted himself in a
"malicious, unethical and grossly negligent" manner; and (3) attempted to employ the mal-
practice action "as a discovery device in order to ascertain where responsibility could be
placed." Id.
211 89 Misc. 2d at 171, 391 N.Y.S.2d at 62. The plaintiff requested damages for mental
anguish and defamation of character.
2 89 Misc. 2d at 173, 391 N.Y.S.2d at 63.
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versed, holding that the plaintiff's cause of action was maintainable
as a prima facie tort claim."' Justice Sweeney, writing for a unani-
mous court,"' agreed with the conclusion of the trial court that the
plaintiff's allegations failed to state a cause of action under tradi-
tional theories of tort,"' but stated that "the law should never suffer
an injury and a damage without a remedy.""2 7 In support of its
conclusion, the court traced the historical development of prima
facie tort theory and observed that the doctrine played an important
role in preserving a degree of flexibility in the law of torts.6 8 Noting
that "[tihe instant case has its genesis in the drastic increase in
. . . medical malpractice actions. . . , many of which are consid-
ered baseless,"2 69 the court reasoned that the plaintiff should not be
denied relief merely because the facts in the case were unique and
the cause of action novel.20 Without considering the requirements
of special damages and specific intent, the court upheld plaintiff's
cause of action, finding that the allegations set forth "a clear inten-
tional wrong, causing apparent and foreseeable harm to plaintiff,
without excuse or justification." 1 The court stated, however, that
its holding should not be interpreted as creating a cause of action
2u 61 App. Div. 2d at 286, 402 N.Y.S.2d at 253.
The panel consisted of Presiding Justice Mahoney and Justices Greenblott, Sweeney,
Kane and Herlihy.
20 The Drago court concluded that the plaintiff's complaint failed to state a cause of
action for abuse of process because it lacked an allegation that process was used improperly
subsequent to its issuance. See Williams v. Williams, 23 N.Y.2d 592, 246 N.E.2d 333, 298
N.Y.S.2d 473 (1969). Similarly, the complaint was insufficient to state a cause of action for
malicious prosecution, since the defendant had not interfered with the physician's person or
property and the malpractice claim had not been finally adjudicated in favor of the physician.
See id. at 596, 246 N.E.2d at 336, 298 N.Y.S.2d at 476. Finally, the Drago plaintiff could not
maintain a negligence claim as the attorney owed him no legal duty. 61 App. Div. 2d at 285,
402 N.Y.S.2d at 251-52; see Joffe v. Rubenstein, 24 App. Div. 2d 752, 263 N.Y.S.2d 867 (1st
Dep't 1965) (per curiam).
26? 61 App. Div. 2d at 285, 402 N.Y.S.2d at 252 (citing Kujek v. Goldman, 150 N.Y. 176,
44 N.E. 773 (1896); Halio v. Lurie, 15 App. Div. 2d 62, 222 N.Y.S.2d 759 (2d Dep't 1961)).
25 61 App. Div. 2d at 286, 402 N.Y.S.2d at 252. A noted commentator has stated that
[tihe law of torts is anything but static, and the limits of its development are never
set. When it becomes clear that the plaintiff's interests are entitled to legal protec-
tion against the conduct of the defendant, the mere fact that the claim is novel will
not of itself operate as a bar to the remedy.
W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS § 1 (4th ed. 1971) (citing Kujek v. Goldman, 150 N.Y. 176, 44
N.E. 773 (1896)).
219 61 App. Div. 2d at 286, 402 N.Y.S.2d at 252. See generally Note, Rx for New York's
Medical Malpractice Crisis, 11 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PRoBs. 467 (1975). The court seemed
particularly disturbed by the attorney's egregious conduct which it described as "not only
intentional and wrongful, but under the unusual circumstances alleged, irresponsible and
without justification." 61 App. Div. 2d at 286, 402 N.Y.S.2d at 252.
21* 61 App. Div. 2d at 286, 402 N.Y.S.2d at 252.
271 Id.
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"whenever a physician escapes malpractice liability and claims he
was wrongfully charged in the first place."' 2
Despite the court's disclaimer, it is submitted that the Drago
decision represents an unwarranted departure from well-established
precedent. While the third department's concern with the lack of an
existing tort remedy to redress injuries resulting from frivolous mal-
practice suits is understandable,2 3 its use of the prima facie tort
theory does not appear to be a suitable solution to the problem.
Although the doctrine was developed to preserve some flexibility in
the law of torts,24 it was not intended to be a catch-all remedy for
civ'il grievances not rising to the level of a traditional tort.25 The
court's application of the doctrine to the facts in Drago seems incon-
sistent with the narrow approach to the prinia facie tort theory
traditionally taken by the New York courts. 6 Since the doctrine
makes a defendant liable for conduct that is not actionable absent
"7 Id. at 286-87, 402 N.Y.S.2d at 253.
273 Physician suits against lawyers for the groundless institution of medical malpractice
actions have taken a number of unsuccessful forms. Actions for malicious prosecution, abuse
of process, defamation, intentional infliction of mental distress and prima facie tort have met
with minimal success. See Birnbaum, Physicians Counterattack: Liability of Lawyers for
Instituting Unjustified Medical Malpractice Actions, 45 FoRDHAm L. Rav. 1003 (1977); Note,
Physician Countersuits: Malicious Prosecution, Defamation and Abuse of Process as Reme-
dies For Meritless Medical Malpractice Suits, 45 U. CmsN. L. REv. 604 (1976); note 266 supra.
2' See, e.g., Belsky v. Lowenthal, 62 App. Div. 2d 319, 405 N.Y.S.2d 62 (lst Dep't 1978);
Susskind v. Ipco Hosp. Supply Corp., 49 App. Div. 2d 915,373 N.Y.S.2d 627 (2d Dep't 1975);
Ruza v. Ruza, 286 App. Div. 767, 146 N.Y.S.2d 808 (1st Dep't 1955); Sheppard v. Coopers'
Inc., 13 Misc. 2d 862, 156 N.Y.S.2d 391 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County), aff'd mem., 2 App. Div. 2d
881, 157 N.Y.S.2d 898 (lst Dep't 1956); Brown, The Rise and Threatened Demise of the Prima
Facie Tort Principle, 54 Nw. U.L. Rav. 563, 573 (1959); note 254 supra. The New York Court
of Appeals recently permitted plaintiff to plead alternatively both traditional and prima facie
tort theories of recovery. Board of Educ. v. Farmingdale Classroom Teacher's Ass'n., Local
1889, 38 N.Y.2d 397, 406, 343 N.E.2d 278, 284-85, 380 N.Y.S.2d 635, 645 (1975); cf. Ruza v.
Ruza, 286 App. Div. 767, 146 N.Y.S.2d 808 (1st Dep't 1955) (alternative pleading not permit-
ted). The Farmingdale decision does not, however, suggest that a defective traditional tort
claim may be converted into a prima facie tort cause of action. In fact, the court noted that
the remedies are mutually exclusive. 38 N.Y.2d at 406, 343 N.E.2d at 284, 380 N.Y.S.2d at
645.
"' See generally Brown, supra note 274; note 277 infra.
21 See note 256 supra. In Test v. Eldot, N.Y.L.J., Feb. 29, 1956, at 7, cal. 4 (Sup. Ct.
N.Y. County), Justice Saypol articulated the rationale most commonly cited as a basis for
retaining the special damages requirement:
To permit a recovery in prima facie tort upon an allegation and proof of general
damage would throw open to regulation of morals and ethics all conduct which,
when substandard, results in injured feelings without other and special damage. It
is allegation of temporal damage which makes such an action maintainable upon a
proper statement of a cause in prima facie tort.
Id.; see, e.g., A.T.I., Inc. v. Ruder & Finn, 42 N.Y.2d 454, 368 N.E.2d 1230, 398 N.Y.S.2d
864 (1977); Advance Music Corp. v. American Tobacco Co., 296 N.Y. 79, 70 N.E.2d 401
(1946); Lincoln First Bank v. Siegel, 60 App. Div. 2d 270, 400 N.Y.S.2d 627 (4th Dep't 1977);
Coopers & Lybrand v. Levitt, 52 App. Div. 2d 493, 384 N.Y.S.2d 804 (1st Dep't 1976).
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special damages and specific intent to injure, the courts have been
careful to avoid applications that would weaken the doctrine's strict
pleading requirements. 27 By permitting the plaintiff to maintain his
suit without alleging special damages or specific intent, the Drago
court extended the remedy well beyond its deliberately circum-
scribed limits. It is suggested that reliance on the third depart-
ment's sub silentio rejection of these well-settled requirements for
prima facie tort actions may meet with differing results when the
factual circumstances are less compelling or the argument is ad-
vanced before a different tribunal?8
Dennis Glazer
Court of Appeals signals stricter enforcement of Sandoval guidelines
It is well settled in New York that a defendant who testifies in
his own behalf may be cross-examined concerning prior criminal,
vicious or immoral acts which tend to impugn his credibility? 9 Such
rn In Ruza v. Ruza, 286 App. Div. 767, 146 N.Y.S.2d 808 (1st Dep't 1955), the court
stated the oft-quoted rule regarding the prima facie tort doctrine and its function:
The key to the prima facie tort is the infliction of intentional harm, resulting
in damage, without excuse or justification, by an act or a series of acts which would
otherwise be lawful. The need for the doctrine of prima facie tort arises only because
the specific acts relied upon-and which it is asserted caused the injury-are not,
in the absence of the intention to harm, tortious, unlawful, and therefore, action-
able.
Id. at 769, 146 N.Y.S.2d at 811; see note 256 supra.
'1 In a recent decision, Belsky v. Lowenthal, 62 App. Div. 2d 319, 405 N.Y.S.2d 62 (1st
Dep't 1978), the Appellate Division, First Department, reversed a trial court's finding that a
defective complaint for malicious prosecution of a medical malpractice suit could be sus-
tained as a prima facie tort claim.
zii See, e.g., People v. Sandoval, 34 N.Y.2d 371, 376, 314 N.E.2d 413, 417, 357 N.Y.S.2d
849, 854 (1974); People v. Kass, 25 N.Y.2d 123, 125, 250 N.E.2d 219, 221, 302 N.Y.S.2d 807,
809 (1969); People v. Webster, 139 N.Y. 73, 84, 34 N.E. 730, 733 (1893); E. FISCH, NEW YORK
EVIDENcE § 702 (2d ed. 1977) [hereinafter cited as FIscH]; 3 L. FRuMER & E. BISKIND,
BENDER'S NEW YoRK EVIDENCE § 141 (1975) [hereinafter cited as FRUMER & BisKIND]; W.
RICHARDSON, EVIDENCE § 498 (10th ed. J. Prince 1973) [hereinafter cited as RcHARDsON]; 3A
J. WIGNORE, EVIDENcE § 890 (rev. ed. 1970). At early common law, individuals convicted of
an "infamous crime" were believed to be predisposed to commit perjury and thus were
prohibited from testifying before any court. FIsCH, supra, §§ 262, 263; C. McCORMIcK, LAW
OF EVIDENCE § 43 (2d ed. 1972); 2 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 519 (3d ed. 1940); Note, The
Dilemma of the Defendant Witness in New York: The Impeachment Problem Half-Solved,
50 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 129, 134 (1975). In 1879, the New York Legilsature abolished this
prohibition but retained its underlying philosophy by enacting a statute that permitted
introduction of past convictions as a means of impeaching a witness. Ch. 542, § 832,[1879]
N.Y. Laws 609 (current version at CPLR 4513 (McKinney 1963)). Today, the New York
approach is followed in a majority of jurisdictions. 3A J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 890 (rev. ed.
1970).
